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Article	Summary		
	
The	word	‘know’	is	exceptional	for	a	number	of	reasons.	It	is	one	of	the	10	most	commonly	used	verbs	in	
English,	alongside	basic	verbs	like	‘be,’	‘do,’	‘say,’	‘have,’	and	‘go.’	It	is	also	the	most	frequently	used	
term	in	epistemic	evaluation:	we	speak	of	‘knowing’	far	more	often	than	we	speak	of	‘justification,’	
‘reliability,’	‘understanding,’	‘wisdom,’	and	other	intellectual	traits	or	epistemic	properties.	Perhaps	
most	strikingly,	the	word	‘know’	allegedly	has	a	meaning-equivalent	in	every	human	language.	Unlike	
almost	every	other	word	in	English,	linguists	have	identified	‘know’	as	one	of	a	very	small	number	of	
words	that	are	culturally	universal	(Goddard	2010).	These	facts	suggest	that	knowledge	is	deeply	
important	to	human	life.		
	
Knowledge	has	also	held	a	central	place	in	epistemology.	Indeed,	the	word	‘epistemology’	comes	from	
the	Greek	word	epistêmê,	which	is	often	translated	as	‘knowledge.’	This	is	not	to	say	that	
epistemologists	are	only	interested	in	knowledge.	They	also	investigate	epistemic	virtues	like	open-
mindedness	and	intellectual	humility,	as	well	as	properties	of	belief	like	being	rational	and	justified	
(among	many	other	things).	Still,	the	enterprise	of	epistemology	has	largely	been	an	investigation	into	
the	nature,	significance,	sources,	and	extent	of	human	knowledge.		
	
But	what	is	knowledge?	Why	do	we	value	it?	How	is	it	acquired?	And	how	much	of	it	do	we	have?		
	
In	the	late	20th	century,	one	of	the	central	questions	asked	by	epistemologists	was:	When	does	a	true	
belief	count	as	knowledge?	It	was	widely	assumed	that	knowledge	is	a	form	of	true	belief	plus	some	
additional	requirement(s),	such	as	justification	or	reliability.	While	this	view	about	the	nature	of	
knowledge	is	still	popular,	it	came	under	scrutiny	at	the	turn	of	the	21st	century.	Instead	of	thinking	that	
knowledge	must	be	analysed	in	terms	of	more	basic	components	like	truth,	belief,	and	justification,	
Timothy	Williamson	(2000)	suggested	that	we	should	take	knowledge	as	basic	and	use	it	to	understand	
belief,	evidence,	and	other	things.		
	
This	reversal	of	the	traditional	approach	coincided	with	a	renewed	interest	in	the	value	of	knowledge.	
The	problem	of	explaining	why	knowledge	is	valuable	goes	back	at	least	to	Plato’s	Meno,	but	
epistemologists	are	now	systematically	investigating	this	question.	The	value	of	knowledge	also	bears	on	
one	of	the	most	famous	of	all	philosophical	problems:	scepticism.	The	history	of	epistemology	is,	in	large	
part,	an	attempt	to	reply	to	the	sceptic’s	claim	that	knowledge	is	impossible.	But	whether	we	should	
care	about	scepticism	depends	on	whether	knowledge	is	valuable.	Some	philosophers	have	argued	that	
knowledge	has	no	distinctive	value	(e.g.,	Kaplan	1985),	while	others	have	claimed	that	knowledge	is	vital	
for	human	survival,	cooperation,	and	flourishing	(e.g.,	Craig	1990).		
1.	What	is	Knowledge?	
	
The	question	“What	is	knowledge?”	has	often	been	understood	as:	what	is	the	correct	analysis	or	
definition	of	the	concept	of	knowledge?	The	basic	idea	is	that	we	can	analyse	knowledge	by	limning	the	
structure	of	the	concept	of	knowledge,	and	the	ideal	result	is	an	analysis	formulated	in	terms	of	the	
concept’s	individually	necessary	and	jointly	sufficient	conditions.	However,	other	theorists	take	a	
metaphysical,	or	non-conceptual	approach.	Instead	of	asking	what	it	takes	for	something	to	satisfy	our	
concept	of	knowledge,	they	ask	what	knowledge	is	(see	Kornblith	2002).	To	analyse	knowledge,	on	this	
interpretation,	is	to	identify	the	components	of	knowledge	itself.		
	
Unfortunately,	philosophers	are	often	unclear	about	whether	they	are	engaged	in	the	conceptual	or	
metaphysical	project.	Is	the	subject	matter	of	epistemology	knowledge	itself,	or	our	concept	of	
knowledge,	or	the	word	‘knows’?	How	best	to	answer	the	question	“What	is	knowledge?”	will	likely	
depend	on	what	kind	of	thing	we	take	knowledge	to	be.	Is	it	a	natural	kind,	like	gold	or	water,	which	
calls	for	a	scientific	investigation	(akin	to	a	chemist	who	analyses	chemical	compositions)?	Is	it	a	mental	
state	that	is	best	studied	by	psychologists	or	philosophers?	Is	it	a	pragmatic	concept	that	we	use	to	
evaluate	the	epistemic	standing	of	others,	but	which	does	not	refer	to	any	particular	mental	state	or	
natural	kind?	Philosophers	disagree	not	only	about	the	nature	of	knowledge	but	also	how	to	investigate	
it.		
	
Plausibly,	there	are	different	types	of	knowledge.	I	can	know	how	to	ride	a	bicycle	(this	is	called	‘know-
how’).	I	can	know	a	person,	like	knowing	my	wife	(this	is	called	‘knowledge	by	acquaintance’).	I	can	also	
know	facts,	like	knowing	that	dogs	are	mammals	(this	is	called	‘know-that’	or	‘propositional	
knowledge’).	In	the	first	example,	I	possess	a	skill;	in	the	second,	I	am	acquainted	with	someone;	in	the	
third,	I	know	a	piece	of	information.		
	
The	relationships	between	these	types	of	knowledge	are	disputed.	Some	think	that	knowledge-how	
reduces	to	knowledge	that	(Stanley	and	Williamson	2001),	while	others	deny	this	(Ryle	1949).	Some	
have	construed	knowing	a	person	as	equivalent	to	knowing	facts	about	them	and	possessing	the	skill	of	
being	able	to	distinguish	that	person	from	other	objects	(see	also	Knowledge,	Concept	of	-	version	1).	
Whether	it	is	possible	to	reduce	one	form	of	knowledge	to	another	is	an	ongoing	debate	amongst	
epistemologists.		
	
By	and	large,	analyses	of	propositional	knowledge	have	overshadowed	attempts	to	elucidate	other	kinds	
of	knowledge.	We	might	question	whether	it	is	right	to	make	propositional	knowledge	the	central	focus	
of	epistemology.	According	to	Colin	McGinn	(1984),	it	is	a	“dubious	procedure”	to	confine	our	attention	
to	propositional	knowledge,	given	that	the	concept	of	knowledge	occurs	in	a	variety	of	different	
locutions—knowing	how,	knowing	who	(which,	where,	etc.),	knowing	that.	McGinn	says,	“it	is	a	
condition	of	adequacy	upon	an	account	of	knowledge	that	it	display	the	unity	in	this	family	of	locutions”	
(1984:	529).	But	we	might	reject	this	idea	because	languages	other	than	English	do	not	always	use	the	
same	word	for	both	propositional	knowledge	and	other	types	of	‘knowledge.’	For	example,	most	
romance	languages	have	a	different	word	for	knowing	a	person,	place,	or	thing	vs.	knowledge	of	facts.	
So	perhaps	we	shouldn’t	be	optimistic	about	a	unified	analysis.	Still,	we	might	wonder	why	English	has	
the	same	word	to	pick	out	these	different	things.		
	
	
2.	Is	Knowledge	Justified	True	Belief?			
	
An	interest	in	analysing	knowledge	dates	back	to	Plato,	but	it	reached	its	climax	in	the	late	20th	century,	
following	the	publication	of	Edmund	Gettier’s	influential	article	in	1963.	According	to	Gettier,	the	
traditional	view	of	knowledge	is	false.	The	traditional	view,	which	Gettier	attributes	to	Plato,	A.	J.	Ayer,	
and	Roderick	Chisholm,	is	that	knowledge	has	three	components:	belief,	truth,	and	justification.	In	other	
words,	a	person	S	knows	some	proposition	p	if	and	only	if	S	has	a	justified	true	belief	that	p.	However,	
Gettier	described	two	hypothetical	cases	in	which	a	person	has	a	justified	true	belief	that	does	not	
qualify	as	knowledge.	Here’s	an	example	of	such	a	case	(though	not	Gettier’s	own):	A	person	looks	at	a	
clock	that	stopped	twelve	hours	ago	and	luckily	forms	a	true	belief	that	it	is	now	two	o’clock.	Such	a	
person	intuitively	does	not	have	knowledge,	yet	they	seem	to	have	a	justified	true	belief.	These	sort	of	
cases	left	philosophers	with	the	famous	‘Gettier	problem,’	which	is	the	problem	of	identifying	what	
must	be	added	to	true	belief	(or	justified	true	belief)	to	have	knowledge.		
	
Gettier	showed	that	belief,	truth,	and	justification	are	insufficient	for	knowledge,	but	he	did	not	show	
they	are	inessential	for	knowledge.	Intuitively,	you	cannot	know	a	proposition	unless	you	believe	it	(but	
see	Radford	1966	for	an	objection).	For	example,	“I	know	that	this	table	is	brown,	but	I	don’t	believe	that	
this	table	is	brown”	sounds	incoherent.	Moreover,	you	cannot	know	what	is	false.	Nobody	can	know	
that	Shakespeare	wrote	The	Iliad	because	he	did	not	write	it.	Finally,	true	beliefs	must	be	arrived	at	in	
the	right	way	to	qualify	as	knowledge.	After	all,	a	lucky	guess	would	not	suffice	for	knowledge.	Thus,	we	
need	something	like	justification	for	our	beliefs.		
	
There	is	considerable	disagreement	about	what	the	relevant	sort	of	justification	consists	in.	According	to	
many	historical	figures	(ranging	from	the	ancient	Stoics	to	Descartes),	knowledge	must	be	based	on	
infallible	foundations.	These	foundations	have	been	characterized	in	different	ways,	but	the	general	idea	
is	that	knowledge	requires	the	highest	possible	degree	of	justification—enough	to	guarantee	that	the	
belief	is	true.	Contemporary	thinkers	like	Peter	Unger	(1975)	and	Laurence	BonJour	(2010)	have	
defended	infallibilist	views	of	knowledge.	Unger	argues	that	knowledge	requires	absolute	certainty	(see	
also	Certainty),	whereas	BonJour	maintains	that	justification	must	entail	truth	to	give	us	knowledge.	By	
strengthening	the	justification	condition	in	this	way,	BonJour	says	we	can	escape	the	Gettier	problem.	
Infallibilist	justification	would	guarantee	the	truth	of	our	belief,	thereby	removing	luck	and	avoiding	the	
Gettier	problem.		
	
While	infallibilism	might	escape	the	Gettier	problem,	it	pushes	us	towards	scepticism	(see	also	
Scepticism).	We	humans	rarely	possess	infallible	justification	or	absolute	certainty	for	the	beliefs	we	
take	to	constitute	knowledge.	Infallible	justification	would	therefore	imply	that	we	know	nothing,	or	
almost	nothing.	For	this	reason,	most	epistemologists	are	fallibilists	(see	also	Fallibilism).	A	fallibilist	
believes	that	we	can	have	knowledge	on	the	basis	of	justification	that	does	not	guarantee	our	beliefs	are	
correct.	(This	is	often	called	‘defeasible	justification.’)	We	can	know	that	a	particular	claim	is	true,	on	this	
view,	even	when	our	justification	is	less	than	fully	conclusive.		
	
There	are	many	related	questions	about	the	nature	of	justification	and	knowledge,	such	as	the	debate	
between	internalism	and	externalism	in	epistemology.	Internalists	think	that	justification	is	determined	
solely	by	factors	that	are	internal	to	a	believer,	such	as	introspective	awareness	or	reflective	access.	
Externalists,	by	contrast,	claim	that	a	believer	need	not	have	internal	access	or	cognitive	grasp	of	any	
reasons	or	facts	that	make	their	belief	justified.	Another	debate	is	about	the	structure	of	justification.	
According	to	foundationalism,	all	knowledge	or	justified	belief	rests	ultimately	on	a	foundation	of	
noninferential	knowledge	or	justified	belief	(i.e.	beliefs	that	are	not	justified	by	other	beliefs).	
Coherentists	deny	this	(see	Justification,	coherence	theory	of).	The	coherence	theory	of	justification	
asserts	that	a	belief	is	justifiably	held	when	it	coheres	with	a	set	of	beliefs	that	form	a	coherent	system.	
There	was	a	lively	debate	between	foundationalists	and	coherentists	in	the	late	20th	century	(see	Sosa	
1980),	but	the	philosophical	interest	in	this	topic	has	waned	somewhat.	That	said,	coherentism	has	
resurfaced	in	recent	work	in	the	epistemology	of	understanding	(see	Kvanvig	2003).		
	
	
3.	Theories	of	Knowledge		
	
It	is	widely	accepted	that	Edmund	Gettier	refuted	the	traditional	(justified	true	belief)	analysis	of	
knowledge	in	1963.	Since	then,	much	philosophical	work	has	been	devoted	to	finding	an	analysis	of	
knowledge	in	terms	of	true	belief	plus	some	other	factor	(or	factors).	While	these	solutions	differ	in	their	
details,	they	often	presume	that	the	traditional	account	was	roughly	right,	but	in	need	of	modification	to	
deal	with	Gettier-type	counterexamples.		
	
The	earliest	attempt	to	modify	the	traditional	account	of	knowledge	was	the	‘no	false	belief’	theory	
(Clark	1963).	According	to	this	view,	knowledge	is	a	justified	true	belief	that	is	not	inferred	from	any	
falsehood.	In	Gettier’s	original	cases,	the	people	who	lack	knowledge	seem	to	rely	on	some	crucial	false	
belief	that	(luckily)	leads	them	to	truth.	Thus,	a	simple	fix	would	be	to	add	the	following	condition	to	the	
traditional	analysis	of	knowledge:	one	must	form	one’s	belief	on	true	grounds.	However,	this	view	has	
been	rejected	for	two	reasons:	first,	it	seems	possible	to	get	knowledge	even	when	one’s	belief	is	partly	
based	on	a	falsehood;	second,	there	are	Gettier	cases	that	involve	no	inference	from	a	false	belief	
(Nagel	2014:	ch.4).		
	
A	more	sophisticated	version	of	the	‘no	false	belief’	analysis	is	the	‘no	defeater’	view	(Lehrer	and	Paxton	
1969).	The	basic	idea	is	that	a	justified	true	belief	counts	as	knowledge	if	and	only	if	there	is	no	
unpossessed	evidence	that,	had	the	subject	known	it,	would	have	undermined	their	justification	for	the	
belief.	In	other	words,	S	knows	that	p	only	if	there	is	no	defeater	for	S’s	justification	for	believing	that	p.	
Richard	Foley	(2012)	defends	a	related	idea.	He	says	that	knowledge	requires	one	to	truly	believe	that	p	
and	also	have	“adequate	information.”	Whenever	someone	has	a	true	belief	but	not	knowledge,	there	
will	be	important	information	they	lack.	However,	both	the	‘no	defeater’	view	and	the	‘adequate	
information’	view	have	been	challenged.		
	
A	key	feature	of	Gettier	cases	is	the	lucky	way	in	which	the	agent	arrives	at	a	justified	true	belief.	For	this	
reason,	epistemologists	widely	agree	that	knowledge	is	incompatible	with	at	least	some	types	of	luck	
(see	also	Epistemic	luck).	Peter	Unger	(1968)	suggests	a	straightforward	way	to	analyse	knowledge	in	
light	of	this	fact:	a	belief	is	not	knowledge	if	it	is	true	only	by	accident.	In	other	words,	S	knows	that	p	if	
and	only	if	S	has	a	justified	true	belief	that	p	and	it	is	not	at	all	accidental	(or	lucky)	that	S’s	belief	is	true.	
However,	it	is	unclear	precisely	how	to	spell	out	this	‘anti-luck’	condition.	If	knowledge	is	incompatible	
with	any	luck,	then	must	our	beliefs	be	infallibly	justified?	As	mentioned	in	§2,	few	epistemologists	
accept	such	infallibilist	theories	of	knowledge.		
	
One	kind	of	luck	occurs	when	there	is	a	gap	between	the	source	of	one’s	justification	and	the	fact	that	
makes	one’s	belief	true.	A	good	theory	of	knowledge	would	close	this	gap.	To	accomplish	this,	Alvin	
Goldman	(1967)	replaces	the	justification	condition	in	the	traditional	theory	with	the	following	causal	
condition:	one’s	belief	that	p	is	caused	by	the	fact	that	p.	According	to	this	view,	S	knows	that	p	if	and	
only	if	S’s	true	belief	that	p	is	appropriately	causally	connected	to	the	fact	that	p.	A	benefit	of	this	theory	
is	that	it	seems	to	allow	us	to	escape	the	Gettier	problem.	In	Gettier	cases,	there	is	no	causal	connection	
between	the	subject’s	belief	and	the	fact	that	makes	their	belief	true.		
	
But	Goldman	himself	realized	there	are	cases	in	which	one’s	belief	is	luckily	true,	not	knowledge,	and	is	
nevertheless	appropriately	caused	by	the	relevant	fact	(see	Goldman	1979).	This	led	Goldman	to	
abandon	the	causal	theory	of	knowledge	in	favor	of	a	reliability	account	of	knowing	(see	also	
Reliabilism).	Knowledge,	Goldman	says,	must	arise	out	of	a	reliable	belief-forming	process.		
	
There	are	now	a	variety	of	approaches	that	look	at	the	processes	or	faculties	that	produce	or	sustain	
belief.	The	approach	is	popular	with	‘naturalistic’	philosophers	who	seek	to	analyse	knowledge	in	terms	
of	concepts	that	wouldn’t	be	out	of	place	in	science	(see	also	Naturalized	epistemology).	One	popular	
idea	is	that	true	belief	must	be	the	product	of	an	intellectual	“virtue”	or	“ability”	(see	also	Intellectual	
virtue;	Virtue	epistemology;	Greco	2010;	Sosa	2007;	Zagzebski	1999).	Another	is	that	the	subject’s	belief	
must	track	the	truth	in	close	counterfactual	situations	(Nozick	1981).	These	views	have	all	been	
criticized,	revised,	and	further	criticized.	Some	find	these	views	objectionable	because	they	entail	
externalism	(see	§2;	also	Internalism	and	externalism	in	epistemology).	It	is	a	contested	issue	whether	or	
not	a	belief	can	constitute	knowledge	without	the	believer	having	access	to	evidence	of	their	reliability.		
	
	
4.	Beyond	Analysing	Knowledge		
	
What	must	be	added	to	a	true	belief	in	order	to	make	it	knowledge?	As	we’ve	seen	(in	§3),	
epistemologists	have	no	shortage	of	answers	to	this	question.	Some	theorists	maintain	that	a	true	belief	
must	be	the	product	of	a	reliable	cognitive	process.	Others	maintain	that	a	true	belief	qualifies	as	
knowledge	only	if	it	is	creditable	to	one’s	cognitive	abilities	or	intellectual	virtues.	Others	still	think	that	
a	true	belief	amounts	to	knowledge	only	if	it	is	‘undefeated’	or	is	‘safe’	in	the	sense	that	one’s	belief	
could	not	have	easily	been	false.	This	is	just	a	small	sample	of	views,	all	of	which	assume	that	what	must	
be	added	to	true	belief	in	order	to	have	knowledge	is	something	related	to	true	belief	but	distinct	from	
it.	
	
For	better	or	worse,	all	attempts	to	analyse	knowledge	in	this	way	have	succumbed	to	a	pattern	of	
counterexamples.	There	is,	at	present,	no	convincing	reason	to	expect	knowledge	to	be	analysable	into	
necessary,	sufficient,	and	informative	conditions.	As	a	result,	a	growing	number	of	philosophers	are	
distancing	themselves	from	the	traditional	attempts	to	analyse	knowledge	in	this	way.	Instead	of	
assuming	that	traditional	analyses	were	basically	on	the	right	track,	philosophers	have	been	developing	
new	ways	of	doing	epistemology	outside	the	paradigm	of	the	traditional	approach	(e.g.,	Craig	1990	and	
Williamson	2000).		
	
Peter	Strawson	(1992)	suggests	that	we	adopt	a	less	ambitious	approach	to	investigating	knowledge.	
Instead	of	analysing	knowledge	in	terms	of	more	basic	concepts,	he	says	we	should	seek	connections	
between	a	system	of	interrelated	concepts,	such	that	the	function	of	each	concept	could	be	properly	
understood	only	by	grasping	its	connection	with	other	concepts.	The	aim,	then,	would	be	to	construct	
an	illuminating	conceptual	map	of	a	domain	of	concepts	without	attempting	to	reduce	some	concepts	to	
others.	On	this	view,	conceptual	analysis	should	be	holistic	instead	of	reductive.	Timothy	Williamson	
(2000)	says	we	should	reject	the	assumption	that	knowledge	is	analysable	in	terms	of	more	basic	
notions,	like	belief	and	justification,	and	instead	we	should	treat	knowledge	as	a	basic,	unanalysable	
notion	that	is	used	to	shed	light	on	other	concepts,	like	belief	and	evidence.	Further,	we	can	look	at	how	
knowledge	relates	to	other	matters	of	interest,	such	as	assertion	and	practical	reasoning.		
	
The	study	of	knowledge	ascriptions	has	also	become	a	central	focus	of	epistemology	(see	Brown	and	
Gerken	2012).	One	of	the	prevailing	questions	in	contemporary	epistemology	is	whether	the	semantics	
of	knowledge	ascriptions	is	invariant	or	context	sensitive.	According	to	contextualists,	the	standards	for	
someone	to	truly	count	as	a	‘knower’	vary	in	certain	ways	according	to	features	of	the	conversational	
context	(DeRose	1995;	Lewis	1996;	Cohen	1988).	Invariantists	deny	this.	According	to	insensitive	
invariantists,	what	counts	as	being	in	a	sufficiently	good	epistemic	position	to	know	some	proposition	
does	not	vary	–	is	not	sensitive	to	–	any	facts	about	an	individual’s	practical	interests	at	the	time	in	
question,	whether	it	be	those	of	the	subject,	the	attributor,	or	the	evaluator	of	a	knowledge	claim	(see	
Rysiew	2001	and	Brown	2006).	According	to	sensitive	invariantists,	the	truth-value	of	a	knowledge	claim	
partly	depends	on	facts	about	the	subject’s	practical	interests,	such	as	the	cost	of	being	wrong	
(Hawthorne	2004;	Stanley	2005;	Fantl	and	McGrath	2009).	This	debate	is	closely	connected	to	a	more	
general	debate	about	whether	knowledge	–	or	true	knowledge	attributions	–	depends	on	‘purely	
epistemic	factors’	(e.g.,	whether	a	belief	is	formed	in	a	reliable	way)	or	also	‘practical	factors’	(e.g.,	how	
much	is	at	stake)	(see	also	Pragmatic	encroachment).			
	
	
5.	The	Value	of	Knowledge	
	
Knowledge	has	been	the	primary	focus	of	epistemology.	Presumably,	this	would	not	be	so	if	we	thought	
knowledge	had	little	value.	As	Laurence	BonJour	(2010:	58)	says,	“knowledge	is	the	epistemic	summum	
bonum,”	a	supremely	valuable	cognitive	state	that	marks	the	pinnacle	of	intellectual	achievement.	While	
most	epistemologists	do	not	claim	that	knowledge	is	“supremely	valuable”,	it	is	widely	agreed	that	
knowledge	is	importantly	valuable.		
	
But	some	epistemologists	claim	knowledge	has	little,	if	any,	value.	Mark	Kaplan	(1985)	argues	that	
knowledge	has	no	value	because	it	does	nothing	to	advance	or	clarify	the	proper	conduct	of	inquiry.	
From	the	perspective	of	an	individual	inquirer,	there	is	no	difference	between	determining	whether	one	
believes	something	with	justification	or	knows	it.	Less	radically,	Robert	Pasnau	(2017)	argues	that	
knowledge	is	a	cognitive	state	that	falls	short	of	the	epistemic	ideals	described	in	the	works	of	great	
philosophers	like	Aristotle,	Aquinas,	Descartes,	and	Locke.	Pasnau	argues	that	contemporary	
philosophers	have	become	too	concerned	with	analysing	our	everyday	concept	of	knowledge	instead	of	
describing	the	epistemic	ideal	that	humans	might	hope	to	achieve.		
	
We	can	ask	a	variety	of	questions	about	the	the	value	of	knowledge.	For	example,	we	can	ask	whether	
knowledge	is	more	valuable	than	mere	true	belief,	given	that	true	belief	seems	to	guide	behaviour	just	
as	reliably	as	knowledge.	As	Plato	observed,	a	true	belief	about	the	correct	way	to	Larissa	will	get	you	
there	just	as	well	as	knowing	the	correct	way	(see	Theatetus).	Why,	then,	should	we	prefer	knowledge	
to	true	belief?	We	can	also	ask	whether	knowledge	is	more	valuable	than	any	other	epistemic	standing	
that	falls	short	of	knowledge,	such	as	justified	true	belief.	Duncan	Pritchard	(2007)	calls	this	the	
secondary	value	problem.	Further,	we	can	ask	whether	knowledge	is	more	valuable	than	other	cognitive	
states,	such	as	understanding	or	wisdom.	According	to	Jonathan	Kvanvig	(2003),	knowledge	is	no	more	
valuable	than	justified	true	belief,	so	the	focus	of	epistemology	should	not	be	knowledge	but	rather	
understanding,	which	is	allegedly	more	valuable	than	knowledge	(see	Elgin	2017).	However,	others	have	
argued	that	understanding	is	merely	a	species	of	knowing	and	therefore	has	no	distinctive	value	beyond	
knowledge	(e.g.,	Grimm	2006).		
	
A	growing	consensus	in	epistemology	is	that	an	analysis	of	knowledge	should	make	it	clear	why	
knowledge	is	something	we	care	about	(see	Kvanvig	2003;	Sosa	2000;	Williamson	2000;	and	Zagzebski	
1999).	According	to	BonJour	(2010),	reflecting	on	the	value	of	knowledge	should	lead	us	to	reject	
fallibilism.	He	says	there	is	no	level	of	justification	short	of	infallibility	that	would	make	sense	of	
knowledge’s	value.	According	to	Craig	(1990),	we	can	better	understand	the	value	of	(fallible)	
knowledge	by	reflecting	on	the	importance	of	the	concept	of	knowledge	in	human	life.	His	central	
hypothesis	is	that	the	concept	of	knowledge	plays	the	valuable	role	of	allowing	us	to	identify	reliable	
informants.	But	other	theorists	say	we	should	not	be	concerned	with	questions	about	the	value	of	
concepts	at	all	(DePaul	2009).		
	
	
6.	The	Extent	of	Our	Knowledge	
	
We	tend	to	suppose	that	we	know	a	lot.	I	know	(or,	at	least,	I	think	I	know)	that	Ottawa	is	the	capital	of	
Canada;	that	Plato	was	a	student	of	Socrates;	that	blue	wales	are	the	largest	animals	on	Earth;	and	much	
else	besides.	You	probably	think	you	know	many	things,	too.	But	how	much	do	we	know,	really?		
	
According	to	some	powerful	sceptical	arguments,	we	know	nothing—or	almost	nothing.	There	are	many	
forms	of	scepticism;	for	instance,	we	can	be	sceptics	about	induction,	other	minds,	memory,	or	the	
external	world	(see	also	Scepticism).	There	are	also	a	variety	of	sceptical	arguments.	According	to	the	
ancient	Pyrrhonists,	every	argument	has	an	equal	and	opposing	argument,	so	we	should	suspend	
judgment	on	any	issue	(see	also	Pyrrhonism).	According	to	Descartes,	we	cannot	know	anything	about	
the	world	until	we	remove	all	possible	doubts	(see	also	Doubt;	Descartes,	René).	According	to	David	
Hume,	knowledge	of	unobserved	facts	ultimately	rests	on	question-begging	assumptions	about	the	
reliability	of	induction.	Others	claim	that	scepticism	follows	from	uncontroversial	principles	about	
knowledge	(see	also	Deductive	closure	principle).	Almost	as	soon	as	philosophers	began	asking	“What	is	
knowledge?”	they	found	themselves	confronted	with	powerful	sceptical	challenges.	Thus,	a	large	part	of	
the	epistemological	enterprise	has	been	devoted	to	evaluating	the	sceptic’s	reasoning	and	resisting	the	
sceptic’s	conclusion.	
	
While	scepticism	comes	in	many	forms,	they	all	tend	to	orbit	around	the	following	idea:	we	humans	
have	far	less	knowledge	(or	justification)	than	we	think.	Indeed,	sceptics	purport	to	show	not	only	that	
we	lack	knowledge,	but	also	that	knowledge	is	impossible.	We	fallible	creatures	are	just	too	cognitively	
limited	to	know	the	many	things	that	we	ordinarily	claim	to	know.	And	nothing	we	do	will	improve	our	
epistemic	lot.			
	
Scepticism	is	intimately	connected	with	questions	about	the	nature	of	knowledge.	This	is	because	how	
much	we	know	will	depend	on	what	knowledge	is.	If	knowledge	requires	infallible	justification,	then	we	
know	little,	if	anything,	about	the	world	(see	also	Certainty).	We	rarely	possess	infallible	justification,	
conclusive	reasons,	or	a	perfectly	reliable	basis	for	those	beliefs	we	take	to	constitute	knowledge.	The	
value	of	knowledge	also	bears	on	sceptical	worries.	If	knowledge	is	not	actually	valuable,	then	why	care	
about	the	truth	of	scepticism?	Scepticism	only	matters	if	knowledge	does.	But	despite	the	best	efforts	of	
epistemologists,	there	is	no	widespread	consensus	on	how	to	banish	the	sceptic.		
	
	
7.	The	Purpose(s)	of	Knowledge		
	
Many	philosophers	think	an	adequate	theory	of	knowledge	should	fit	plausible	assumptions	about	the	
role	of	knowledge	in	human	life.	We	may	regard	this	as	a	“functionalist	turn”	in	epistemology.	The	idea,	
put	roughly,	is	that	we	should	try	to	reveal	the	nature	and	value	of	knowledge	by	reflecting	on	the	
practical	importance	of	knowledge	(or	the	concept	of	knowledge).			
	
We	find	this	idea	in	Edward	Craig’s	work	(1990).	Instead	of	analysing	knowledge	into	necessary	and	
sufficient	conditions,	Craig	recommends	that	we	investigate	the	concept	of	knowledge	by	asking,	first,	
what	it	does	for	us	(what	its	role	is)	and	then,	second,	what	a	concept	having	that	role	would	look	like	
(what	conditions	would	govern	its	application).	This	contrasts	with	the	usual	focus	in	epistemology.	
Scholars	investigating	the	nature	of	knowledge	have	tended	to	focus	on	identifying	the	criteria	for	
knowledge	(or	the	application	conditions	for	the	concept	of	knowledge).	But	largely	absent	from	this	
debate	has	been	any	reflection	on	why	knowledge	(or	the	concept	of	knowledge)	would	come	equipped	
with	such	criteria	in	the	first	place.		
	
There	have	been	a	variety	of	proposals	about	what	role	or	functions	knowledge	plays	in	deliberation	and	
epistemic	evaluation;	for	instance,	it	has	been	suggested	that	knowledge	ascriptions	identify	reliable	
informants	(Craig	1990),	signal	the	appropriate	end	of	inquiry	(Kvanvig	2009),	provide	assurance	(Lawlor	
2014),	track	the	epistemic	norm	of	assertion	(Williamson	2000)	and	practical	reasoning	(Hawthorne	
2004),	encourage	good	testimony	(Reynolds	2002),	and	indicate	that	one	is	certain	(BonJour	2010).	This	
plurality	of	views	should	make	us	wonder	whether	knowledge	(or	the	concept	of	knowledge)	has	just	
one	primary	function	or	whether	we	should	be	“pluralists”	about	the	functional	roles	of	knowledge	(see	
Hannon	2019).		
	
These	hypotheses	may	also	shed	new	light	on	epistemic	value.	For	example,	John	Hawthorne	(2004)	
argues	that	knowledge	is	valuable	because	it	plays	a	vital	role	in	practical	reasoning:	that	is,	one	should	
use	a	proposition	p	as	a	premise	in	one's	practical	reasoning	only	if	one	knows	p.	Relatedly,	Kvanvig	
(2009)	argues	that	knowledge	is	valuable	because	it	signals	the	point	of	legitimate	inquiry	closure.	There	
is	an	ongoing	debate	in	epistemology	about	the	social	functions	of	knowledge	and	how	this	connects	to	
epistemic	value.	However,	the	idea	that	we	can	derive	substantial	epistemological	insights	by	reflecting	
on	the	purpose	of	knowledge	is	increasingly	popular	in	philosophy.		
	
But	we	cannot	fully	grasp	the	social	functions	of	knowledge	without	considering	the	connections	
between	knowledge,	power,	and	oppression.	As	feminist	epistemologist	have	long	emphasized,	ethical	
and	political	values	influence	our	understanding	of	knowledge,	the	production	of	knowledge,	and	our	
ability	to	recognize	individuals	as	knowers	(see	Alcoff	and	Potter	1993).	For	example,	Miranda	Fricker	
(2007)	argues	that	a	distinctively	epistemic	injustice	occurs	when	someone	is	ignored	or	not	believed	
because	of	a	prejudice	against	their	gender,	race,	or	another	aspect	of	their	identity.	This	illustrates	that	
ascriptions	of	knowledge	are	often	used	–	consciously	or	not	–	for	nefarious	purposes.	We	commit	a	
‘testimonial	injustice’	when	“prejudice	causes	a	hearer	to	give	a	deflated	level	of	credibility	to	a	
speaker's	word”	(Fricker	2007:	1).	By	contrast,	a	‘hermeneutical	injustice’	occurs	when	speakers	lack	the	
conceptual	resources	to	express	their	knowledge	(either	to	others	or	even	themselves)	due	to	their	
exclusion	from	the	very	activities	that	shape	which	concepts	become	well	known.	
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